"At one time English religion had emphasized the static or the recurrent aspects of worship. Then for a century or more, England was conscious of acting a sacred history as opposed to reenacting it" (43). Sommerville's observation should shock no one familiar with his "century or more," roughly 1530 to 1660, although the declared opposition between "acting" and "reenacting" is likely to strike those who still read Bale, Foxe, Dering, or Dell as rather forced.
1 Yet, so many of the contrasts in Secularization are terribly suggestive, announcing that religion "was changing from devotion to deliberation" (53).
What may surprise some historians, however, is that Sommerville cleverly crafts fresh distinctions in order to dismantle an old and long-cherished one, to describe, that is, the simultaneous secularization and spiritualization of English experience. Textbook wisdom tenaciously holds that secular ambitions and religious Peter Iver Kaufman is Professor of Religious Studies, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. He is the author of Redeeming Politics (Princeton, 1990) ; "The Polytyque Churchen: Religion and Early Tudor Political Culture) (Macon, 1986 commitments were inversely related; one rose when the other fell. Hexter called it "the seesaw theory" and, for the tuxedo crowd, "the assumption of the conservation of historical energy." Sommerville, like Hexter, will have none of this up-and-down. His claim is simply that secularization agreed with English Calvinists. " [T] hey gave the process much of its impetus. Protestants believed that the essential features of their religion could not only survive the separation from other aspects of culture but would be purified by the process" (179). Twelve hundred years earlier, following the ostensible conversion of Constantine, Christianity encouraged desecularization. Markus has recently described "the mass Christianization of Roman society," "the absorption" of the secular.
2 Nesting thereafter in Constantine's shadow, church executives cheered the regimes of purportedly sacred monarchs and sometimes themselves dominated municipal, regional, even imperial affairs. How is it conceivable that a religion accustomed to privilege and power would give "the process" of resecularization "much of its impetus"?
Of the two obvious answers, the first threads through nearly every study of Tudor absolutism: early modern church officials had no choice. To be sure, at other times in other places, princes and magistrates ran roughshod over their priests, but "no other country had a Henry VIII," Sommerville says, tracing secularization to the Henrician intimidation and confiscations of the 153os (181). By then, the English episcopacy had a long record of collaboration with the government. Compliance proved a hard habit to break, even when shrines, monasteries, and episcopal manors were converted "to better uses" (20) . "Better uses," it was claimed during the decisive decade and from a partisan parliamentary perspective, but it was, as Hoskins ingenuously recalled and conscientiously documented, "an age of plunder. "
